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It is well known that quantum technology allows for an unprecedented level of data and software protection
for quantum computers as well as for quantum-assisted classical computers. To exploit these properties, prob-
abilistic one-time programs have been developed, where the encoding of classical software in small quantum
states enables computer programs that can be used only once. Such self-destructing one-time programs facilitate
a variety of new applications reaching from software distribution to one-time delegation of signature authority.
Whereas first proof-of-principle experiments demonstrated the feasibility of such schemes, the practical ap-
plications were limited due to the requirement of using the software on-the-fly combined with technological
challenges due to the need for active optical switching and a large amount of classical communication. Here
we present an improved protocol for one-time programs that resolves major drawbacks of previous schemes, by
employing entangled qubit pairs. This results in four orders of magnitude higher count rates as well the ability to
execute a program long after the quantum information exchange has taken place. We demonstrate our protocol
over an underground fiber link between university buildings in downtown Vienna. Finally, together with our
implementation of a one-time delegation of signature authority this emphasizes the compatibility of our scheme
with prepare-and-measure quantum internet networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Computational algorithms touch almost every aspect of
modern life. In light of continuous data breaches and increas-
ingly stricter legislation on data protection, it would be desir-
able to reduce the amount of private user data leaked in a com-
putation without forcing software owners to completely re-
veal their source code. Quantum computers have been shown
to offer significant advantages in this area. A prominent ex-
ample is blind quantum computation, where an almost clas-
sical client can delegate a quantum computation such that the
quantum server cannot learn any information regarding the in-
put, output and algorithm of the quantum computation [1–5].
While protocols such as this clearly demonstrate that quantum
systems can provide powerful enhancements to the privacy of
computations, full scale quantum computers still present sig-
nificant technical challenges. Thus, it is of particular interest
to investigate hybrid quantum-classical solutions which might
allow for quantum enhancements of classical technology as
well.
A promising direction of investigation is to use small quan-
tum systems (such as single photons, which can be readily
generated and manipulated by state-of-the-art quantum tech-
nology) to augment classical computers, and in particular to
use them as a resource to increase the privacy of computa-
tions. A well-known example of such hybrid systems are
quantum key distribution protocols [6, 7]. Recently, another
such hybrid system was demonstrated for probabilistic one-
time programs [8]. One-time programs are a cryptographic
primitive in which a server provides a client with a software
in such a way that the client can obtain only one input-output
pair (x, f(x)) before the program is destroyed. Both the in-
put of the client and the software of the server remain pri-
vate (up to the information that is leaked by the input-output
pair). One-time programs are considered as a powerful build-
ing block for many cryptographic tasks and could be used for
applications such as software licensing, one-time delegation
of signing abilities and electronic voting schemes. It has, how-
ever, been shown that perfect information theoretically secure
quantum and classical one-time programs are impossible to
implement without the use of one-time self-destructing hard-
ware (hardware which is automatically destroyed after a sin-
gle use) [9–11]. These no-go results can be circumvented by
allowing for the possibility of error in the program outcome
resulting in probabilistic one-time programs [8].
Probabilistic one-time programs encode classical software
onto single-qubit quantum states which are then sent to a
client for evaluation. The client can choose the input to the
program by choosing the basis they measure the qubit in using
a measurement operator taken from a set of anti-commuting
operators. Thus, evaluation for one input prevents them from
gaining information about a complimentary input. The out-
put of the measurement will be the output of the gate. While
demonstrating the implementability of probabilistic one-time
programs the protocol presented in [8] faced a number of chal-
lenges with respect to theory and technological requirements
that limit the practical implementation.
One of the most important challenges in the practical im-
plementation of any quantum communication protocol is loss
tolerance. As no real-life quantum channel is without loss, in
order for a protocol to be practical, it must allow for a certain
level of loss of information. While the previous scheme could
achieve loss tolerance, this came at the price of a sub-routine
that required the program sender and receiver to implement
classical back-and forth communication after the exchange of
each individual qubit. Furthermore, it required the receiver
of the one-time program to immediately execute the program
unless they had access to a non-demolition measurement of
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2the photon number (to perform the loss-tolerance sub-routine)
and a quantum memory. Finally, the gate rates of the scheme
were limited by the mentioned need for a large amount of clas-
sical communication as well as the need of active polarization
switches, resulting in a gate rate of about 0.7Hz.
Here we present an improved protocol that exploits quan-
tum entanglement to overcome the aforementioned limita-
tions. We further demonstrate the enhanced practicality for
real-life scenarios by using OTPs to digitally sign a message
protocol using an underground fiber link that connects two
buildings of the University in Vienna. Experimentally, our
protocol is based on sharing a maximally entangled qubit pair,
a so-called Bell state [12], among the software provider (Al-
ice) and the client (Bob), who shall use the software only
once. Alice performs random measurements on her half of
the Bell state that lead to the remote preparation of four dif-
ferent states, covering all possible one-bit software gate op-
erations, on Bobs side. Bob randomly chooses his measure-
ment basis which defines input 0 or input 1. This leads to a
shared table of randomly prepared input-output pairs. Now,
when Alice and Bob keep their lists of respective outcomes,
then Alice and Bob can use classical communication only to
select the required gates for implementing the program with
the corresponding input. Here it is important to point out that
the execution of the program can happen long after the quan-
tum information exchange and without any need for long-term
quantum memories. Another conceptual advantage is that the
use of Bell states enables the detection of a potential eaves-
dropper via a man-in-the-middle attack with the aim to ex-
tract information of the program. From a technological point
of view this scheme allows for a strongly improved gate rate
for the transmission of gates as this protocol relies only on
passive optical elements. This is demonstrated by achieving
gate rates of about 10 kHz after a transmission via a 650m
of fiber link that runs partially through Viennas underground
sewer system; corresponding to an increase in gate rate of
four orders of magnitude when being compared to previous
schemes that had to use active state preparation for each gate.
Besides the demonstration of delegated probabilistic one-time
programs by making use of a previously established commod-
ity table, we show that low-noise applications are possible via
the implementation of one-time delegation of signature au-
thority. We achieve success probabilities of > 99% for hav-
ing Bob, as client, signing a message in Alices (the program
provider’s) name.
II. THEORY
We define a one-time program as follows: a sender or
provider, Alice, supplies resources related to a function f(·)
to a receiver or client, Bob, which allow him to evaluate f(x)
while gaining no knowledge of f(x′), for any x′ 6= x, other
than what is directly implied by f(x). Alice in turn obtains
no information regarding Bob’s input x. As it was shown that
perfect, information theoretically secure OTPs in the classi-
cal and quantum case are impossible without further assump-
tions on hardware or abilities of an adversary [9, 10, 13] we
allow for a bounded probability of error in the program out-
put when encoding classical software onto quantum states [8]
yielding probabilistic one-time programs. To achieve these
probabilistic OTPs we start with the most basic logical gates
which map a single input bit to a single output bit. We will
refer to these gates as G1 gates. Alice will encode her choice
of gate onto a quantum state (typically a qubit) while Bob’s
input will correspond to his measurement basis. We choose
to encode Bob’s input as measurement in σZ for an input of
0 and a measurement in σX for an input of 1. This allows
Alice to, probabilistically, encode the four possible G1 gates
(Identity, NOT, Constant-Zero and Constant-One) as one of
the following four single-qubit quantum states (truth tables
of the gates and Bloch-sphere representation of the states are
shown in Fig. 1a):
|Ψ0〉 = 1√
2 +
√
2
(|0〉+ |+〉) (1a)
|Ψ1〉 = 1√
2 +
√
2
(|1〉 − |−〉) (1b)
|ΨId〉 = 1√
2 +
√
2
(|0〉+ |−〉) (1c)
|Ψnot〉 = √
2 +
√
2
(|1〉+ |+〉) (1d)
where |±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ± |1〉).
It has been shown [8] that these four basic gates allow for
universal classical computing when being combined with a
larger classical circuit in a fixed configuration. Remarkably,
the circuit arrangements can be public as only the basic gate
operations need to be secret to hide the implemented software.
In the original OTP scheme the basic gates were consecu-
tively mapped onto quantum states, realized as single photons,
and then send to a receiver that had to measure them in the
same exact order for implementing the function (software).
The scheme presented here exploits quantum entanglement to
create randomness as a resource for an enhanced protocol that
allows to share OTPs that can be used at any time.
The new protocol is composed of two distinct parts: a quan-
tum part in which Alice sends a random sequence of gate-
OTPs which Bob measures in a random basis and a clas-
sical part where classical communication is used to imple-
ment a OTP using the previously shared information from
the quantum part. To randomly prepare one of the gate states
(|Ψ0〉 , |Ψ1〉 , |ΨId〉 , |Ψnot〉) Alice generates a maximally en-
tangled Bell-state, measures it randomly in one of two bases
(|Ψ0〉 / |Ψ1〉) or (|ΨId〉 / |Ψnot〉) which leads to a remote state
generation on the other qubit that is sent to Bob. Thus, Bob
will receive a random gate-OTP which he will randomly mea-
sure in σZ (input 0) or σX (input 1). Alice notes the gates
sent while Bob records the input-output pairs, and both keep
their results private. The remaining events make up a table of
imperfectly correlated results where the percentage of correct
input-output pairs is given by P1 = 12√2 +
1
2 ≈ 0.85. This
is referred to as a shared table and will later be used as clas-
sical commodity or resource to perform a program. Alice and
Bob repeat this process until they have constructed a shared
3table of sufficient length for the program(s) they want to per-
form. Note that this results in the sequence of gates being in-
dependent and identically distributed (IID). In case of channel
losses Alice and Bob will exchange information about when
they have sent and received qubits, repectively. Only the re-
sults of events in that both parties agree that a qubit was sent
and measured will be kept, all other results will be discarded.
Thus, channel losses do not affect the security of the protocol,
as only coincidence events generate entries in the shared table
and other events will not be used for the protocol.
After the distribution the shared table can be used to run an
OTP (see flow chart in Fig. 2). To execute a gate Alice will
FIG. 1. Scheme for probabilistic one-time programs: a) shows the
truth tables defining all possible 1-bit logic gates together with the
quantum states representing the different G1 gates on the Bloch-
sphere. In b) we give the mapping of Bob’s binary inputs to a mea-
surement basis. An input of 0 maps to a measurement in the σZ
(Z) basis while an input of 1 maps to a measurement in the σX (X)
basis. Outputs are defined to be 0 if Bob projects onto the positive
eigenstate and 1 for the negative eigenstate. The success probability
of the gates is given by PS = 12√2 +
1
2
≈ 0.85. b) Establishing
the shared table : Alice randomly prepares one of the four possi-
ble 1-bit gate-OTPs by randomly measuring her |Ψ−〉 Bell-state in
one of the two bases given by |Ψ0〉 / |Ψ1〉 and |ΨId〉 / |Ψnot〉. This
collapses Bob’s qubit into the orthogonal state which is sent over a
quantum channel to Bob. He will randomly measure in σZ or σX ,
corresponding to a random input of 0 or 1 to the gate. Alice notes
the gates sent (blue shaded row) and Bob the inputs and outputs of
the gate (red shaded row). These (classical) records form the shared
table which will later be used to execute a program. Alice and Bob
repeat this procedure until a sufficient amount of gate-OTPs has been
exchanged. To increase clarity of the illustrations the gates are shown
here with a 100% success probability. In a real implementation Bob
will receive the correct output with a probability of PS ≈ 0.85.
first generate a random bit r. If r = 0 she looks at her part
of the shared table and finds a line with the desired gate, if
r = 1 she finds a line with the opposite gate (i.e. the gate
for which all outputs are flipped). Lines she skips over while
looking for an appropriate gate will be deleted from the ta-
ble. She will then ask Bob if he can use this line. If Bob’s
desired input is equal to the (random) input in that line of the
table, he will accept. Otherwise he will decline the use of the
line and they will repeat the process (using a newly generated
r). Only when Bob accepts to use a line Alice will reveal the
corresponding value of r. If r = 1 Bob will have to flip the
result of the gate used. Once a line is used (accepted or de-
clined) it will be deleted from the shared table. Alice and Bob
will iterate this process until the desired circuit is completed.
The use of the random one-time-pad (r) to encrypt Bob’s out-
put prevents information leakage in the case that Bob chooses
to not use any given line (honestly or dishonestly) as without
the line’s pad value he gains no information. If the individ-
ual gates are used as building blocks for a larger circuit Alice
might be concerned about Bob learning the intermediate re-
sults of this circuit. She can prevent this by randomly insert-
ing pairs of NOT gates, with a probability of 1/2, between the
gates and subsequently absorbing them into the neighbouring
gates as described in [8]. This will not alter the outcome of
the overall program but effectively apply a one-time pad on
the intermediate results of the circuit.
FIG. 2. Flow chat showing the instructions for Alice and Bob to
securely evaluate a single G1 gate-OTP. The runtime of the classi-
cal part scales linearly with the complexity of function and latency
between the parties as shown in the appendix.
Remarkably, the quantum channel connecting Alice and
Bob only needs to be maintained for the period required to
generate the shared table. Thus, the creation of the shared
table may occur long before the classical communication to
execute a program and a large shared table might be used to
execute several programs.
Furthermore, we can consider the situation where an eaves-
dropper might perform a man-in-the-middle attack to steal
the OTP. Such an eavesdropper attempting to intercept the
4program would need to be present in both, the quantum
and the classical channel to recreate all steps of the proto-
col. Intercepting the classical channel alone is of no use as
the implementation of a gate OTP requires also the knowl-
edge of the shared table. However, for obtaining this knowl-
edge an eavesdropper must intercept the quantum channel by
measuring and resending the quantum states. In analogy to
entanglement-based quantum cryptography protocols [7] this
can be detected by Alice and Bob when using a subset of their
shared tables lines for evaluating a Clauser-Horne-Shimony-
Holt (CHSH) Bell inequality [14]. Advantageously, the mea-
surement settings for obtaining the CHSH-Bell-parameter can
be directly extracted from the used setting for implementing
the OTP. Thus Alice and Bob just need to choose at the time
when the program is executed which rows of the shared table
should be taken for detecting a potential eavesdropper.
Finally, we would like to note that our OTPs are equiva-
lent to noisy examples of random
(
2
1
)
-oblivious transfer (OT),
a versatile cryptographic resource allowing a user to access
a subset of database entries or messages a sender transmits
without the sender knowing which entry was accessed. OT
is known to be sufficient for many secure multi-party pro-
cesses [15–17] such as homomorphic encryption [18] and bit
commitment [19]. Classically, OT may only be performed
with assumptions on the computational power of the parties
[20] and is known to be impossible to implement even with
quantum computers when information theoretic security is re-
quired [13].
III. EXPERIMENTAL IMPLEMENTATION
We experimentally demonstrated our entanglement-based
one-time programs between two university buildings sepa-
rated by approximately 200m air-line distance (approximately
650m in fiber) in down-town Vienna.
Alice initially prepares a maximally entangled Bell-state
|Ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 |1〉 − |1〉 |0〉). She keeps one of the qubits
in her local laboratory and sends it to a 50/50-beamsplitter.
One output arm of the beamsplitter leads to a measurement de-
vice configured to measure in the basis spanned by |Ψ0〉 and
|Ψ1〉, while qubits leaving the beamsplitter in the other out-
put will be measured in the basis given by |ΨId〉 and |Ψnot〉.
The second qubit is sent to Bob through a quantum channel,
which is realized by a standard telecom fiber that is located
partially in Vienna’s sewer system. Bob uses a similar mea-
surement apparatus as Alice, which also relies on a 50/50-
beamsplitter leading to measurement devices projecting in σZ
and σX bases. Both Alice and Bob record their measurement
results and thus the gates send respectively the input and out-
put of the program, which allows them to generate the shared
table. A scheme of our set-up is shown in Fig. 3.
To prepare the Bell state Alice uses a novel photon source
design (adapted from [21]) for generating entangled photon
pairs with tailored wavelengths such that the transmitted pho-
ton faces minimal absorption loss in fiber and that the local
photon can be efficiently detected with standard detector tech-
nology. This single-pass spontaneous parametric down con-
FIG. 3. Experimental setup and approximate fiber path connecting
Alice and Bob: a) The laboratories of Alice and Bob are located
at different buildings of the University in Vienna, but connected by
a quantum channel consisting of a single-mode fiber (Corning SMF-
28) with a lenght of 641m. b) Polarization entangled photons are cre-
ated via SPDC using a 515nm cw-pump-laser directed on to a ppKTP
crystal, emitting polarisation-entangled photon pairs in a |Ψ−〉 =
1√
2
(|H〉s |V 〉l + eiθ |V 〉s |H〉l) Bell state with λs = 785nm and
λl = 1498nm (Telecom S-Band). A dichroic mirror (DM) sepa-
rates the photons by wavelength followed by a long-pass filter (LPF)
to block the pump light in both arms and a narrow bandwidth filter
(NBF), to ensure spectral indistinguishability of the H and V pho-
tons, in the long-wavelength arm. In the short-wavelength arm we
use calcite wedges as phase shifters to compensate temporal walk-off
and a liquid crystal retarder (LCR) to set precisely the phase θ in the
Bell state. Alice uses a beam-splitter (BS) to randomly choose her
measurement basis. The measurement is realized using in-fiber po-
larization control, two fiber-polarizing beam-splitters (PBS) and four
Si-Avalanche-Photo-Diodes (APD). The second photon is transmit-
ted through ≈ 650m of standard Telecom fibre to Bob’s laboratory.
Bob uses one fiber-BS, in-fiber polarization control, two PBSs and
four superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors (SNSPDs) to
randomly measure the received photons in one of two bases σZ and
σX corresponding to input 0 and 1 respectively.
version (SPDC) source emits highly non-degenerate polariza-
tion entangled photons pairs in the |Ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉s |V 〉l −
|V 〉s |H〉l) Bell state, where |H〉 corresponds to horizon-
tal and |V 〉 to vertical polarisation and s and l denote the
short (785nm) and long (1498nm) wavelength path. In our
source two down-conversion processes are phase-matched in
the same crystal yielding photon pairs of |H〉s |V 〉l as well
as |V 〉s |H〉l polarization. These are superimposed to create
a Bell-state of the form 1√
2
(|H〉s |V 〉l + eiθ |V 〉s |H〉l). To
ensure the spectral indistinguishably of these two processes a
tunable narrow bandwidth-filter is inserted in the long wave-
length path. A phase shifter is used to compensate for the
varying time delays due to mismatched group velocities in the
5crystal and a liquid crystal retarder is used to set the phase
angle θ of the produced Bell state. The pump-wavelength
and crystal poling-period were chosen such that the source
emits one photon in the Telecom range at 1498nm (Telecom
S-Band) and the other photon in the near-infrared range at
785nm which is a standard wavelength for optical manipu-
lation and in particular for efficient detection by using com-
mercial Silicon Avalance Photo-Diodes (APDs). The Telecom
(1498nm) photon is sent through approximately 650m of fiber
to Bob’s laboratory where they are detected by superconduct-
ing nano-wire detectors, as this wavelength suffers from low
losses in fiber transmission. This results in a coincidence and
thus gate rate of 10kHz corresponding to an improvement in
gate rate by four orders of magnitude compared to the previ-
ous implementation [8].
IV. IMPLEMENTED PROGRAM
We show the experimental implementation of a protocol for
one-time delegation of signature authority in which Alice en-
ables Bob to sign exactly one message in her name. While in
general the complexity of programs that can be implemented
by our approach is limited by their probabilistic nature, this
protocol’s success probability can be increased (in principle
arbitrarily close to 1) without compromising the security [8].
Digital signatures are a widely employed technique used for
contract signing, software distribution, e-mails and numerous
other applications. Sometimes it is desirable to delegate these
capabilities (e.g. to a lawyer), which classically corresponds
to handing over one’s private key. However, this enables the
recipient to sign an unlimited number of messages as the clas-
sical software used for signing can, in principle, always be
copied. Thus, should one wish to limit the number of mes-
sages that can be signed, this cannot be done classically. OTPs
on the other hand enable us to implement a one-time delegated
signatures as introduced in [8] with information theoretic se-
curity following the described steps:
1. Encryption: Alice prepares a set of OTPs that will per-
form encryption with her private key(s). As the encryp-
tion will be done bitwise it is sufficient to use G1 gate-
OTPs in this step. She sends these gate-OTPs over to
Bob. For every bit that Bob wants to encrypt, Alice will
send N independently encrypting gate-OTPs. These
will result in multiple independent encryptions which
will later allow her to achieve an increased probability
of success.
2. Message: Bob chooses the message he wants to sign in
Alice’s name. As in classical digital signatures he takes
the hash of this message which ensures that his input
into the protocol will always be of the same length m.
3. Signing: Bob uses the bits of his hash as inputs into
the gate-OTPs. The output of the gate-OTPs will form
the delegated signature. As he receives N gate-OTPs
per bit of the hash, the length of the signature will be
L = m ·N .
4. Verification: Bob sends the signature together with the
signed message back to Alice for verification. Alice
will accept the signature as valid if the expected per-
centage of output bits is correct. Thus, she will define
a lower bound or threshold τ on the probability of suc-
cess she will accept for the encryption of every indi-
vidual bit in the hash. Should one or more bits of the
hash have been signed with a probability of success be-
low her threshold she will abort the protocol (see also
Fig. 4b).
Intrinsically the individual gate-OTPs have a success prob-
ability of PS = 12√2 +
1
2 ≈ 0.85. The overall success prob-
ability of the protocol is however increased by using multi-
ple gate-OTPs per bit of the hash. In fact, by increasing N
the probability that at least τ · N evaluations are correct (i.e.
the success probability of the signature) asymptotically ap-
proaches 1. It is important to note that in order to maintain the
security of the protocol the N gate-OTPs that are used per bit
of the hash are not mere copies of each other but encrypt the
bit independently, i.e. with a different private key.
Experimentally we implemented a one-time delegated sig-
nature using N = 1000 and a SHA3-224 hash (m = 224),
thus per signature we evaluate L = N · m = 224000 gate-
OTPs. Due to experimental imperfections the probability of
success is reduced to P exps = 0.831 ± 0.013 . Given these
values we analysed the probability of success for a honest
Bob, trying so sign one-and-only-one message, compared to
a cheating Bob. To bound the probability of successful cheat-
ing we assume the smallest deviation and thus worst-case
in which Bob tries to sign a second message that differs in
just one bit of the hash from his first message. We consider
his probability of success in dependence of Alice’s threshold
value τ . Furthermore, we assume that a cheating Bob can
achieve the theoretical maximum for P thS =
1
2
√
2
+ 12 ≈ 0.85.
Thus, unless Bob can exploit a collision in the classical hash,
our values give an upper bound for his probability of success.
Considering these numbers we choose τ = 0.776 to maximise
the difference in probability of success between an honest and
a cheating Bob as shown in Fig. 4 where we plot the respec-
tive success probabilities in dependence of τ . At this value a
cheating Bob has a probability of success of Pcheat = 0.11%
while an honest Bob achieves Phon = 99.87%. In figure
Fig. 5 we show a histogram of the combined results of 50
(honest) delegated signatures (corresponding to 11, 200, 000
evaluated gate OTPs) where each bar is generated using the
results of 1000 OTPs. It can be seen that due to experimental
imperfections and drifts in the setup that the average success
probability is lower than the theoretical maximum (green line)
and has a larger standard deviation than expected by a bino-
mial distribution of this mean (red line). Nevertheless, the
protocol is successfully implemented and the threshold of ac-
ceptance by Alice is surpassed every single time.
The evaluation of L gate-OTPs would trivially require eval-
uating L rounds of communication to complete. However, as
none of the gates in the signature scheme are causally con-
nected, Alice and Bob may evaluate all of them concurrently,
thus reducing the expected required rounds of communication
6to log2(L) where L is the total number of gate-OTPs. There-
fore, on average our example program could be implemented
using only 18 rounds of classical communication. Should Al-
ice and Bob be willing to use O(log2(L)) lines per input the
amount of communication rounds can be made constant with
a high probability.
FIG. 4. Delegated signature protocol and comparison of the success
probabilities for different scenarios. a) Evaluation of the signature.
Alice and Bob evaluate L = N ·m lines from the shared table, ac-
cording to the hash of Bobs messages. The signature produces a N
bit string for each bit of the hash, each one required to be correct in
τ · N positions, where the correct output is defined as a ideal im-
plementation of the gate. τ is chosen according to the length of N
to maximise the difference between honest and dishonest probabili-
ties. If Bob tries to cheat and sign two messages that differ in only
one bit of the hash he has to obtain two sets of correct outputs for
N gates (corresponding to one line). This will reduce his average
success probability as shown in [8] and thus his probability to sur-
pass Alice’s threshold. b) The probabilities of signing 1 (honest) or
2 (dishonest) messages using a signature length of N = 1000 and
a hash output size of 224 bits. The difference between the honest
(experimental) and dishonest probability of success is maximised (at
0.9976) for the experimentally found values for a threshold value
of 77.4% (indicated by the red dotted line) which corresponds to a
success probability of 0.9987 and a cheating probability of 0.0011.
V. CONCLUSION
We have presented a new protocol for probabilistic one-
time programs overcoming previous challenges in theory and
experiment. Our implementation exploits quantum entangle-
ment as a resource to achieve random remote state prepara-
FIG. 5. Cumulative histogram of success probabilities in 50 experi-
mental implementations of delegated signatures. The light blue bars
show the experimentally found probabilities of success per bit of the
hash for 50 signatures with 224 hash-bits each, thus from 11200
evaluations (with N = 1000, thus 112, 000, 000 evaluated gate-
OTPs). While due to experimental imperfections the probability of
success is lower than the theoretical maximum, nevertheless Alice’s
acceptance threshold τ is passed every single time. To character-
ize the found distribution we compare it the theoretical (noiseless)
prediction (dashed green line) as well as to a binomial distribution
with the experimentally found mean µexp = 0.831 (red dashed
line) and a fit to the histogram (normal distribution, red solid line,
µexp = 0.831, σexp = 0.013). We attribute the slightly increased
standard deviation in the data compared to the binomial distribution
to drifts in the set-up during data acquisition.
tion resulting in a shared table of correlated input-output pairs
between Alice and Bob. Through separating the quantum
communication from the actual program execution, we en-
able client and sender to perform a one-time program at an
arbitrarily later time only using classical communication. By
deploying our experiment between two university buildings,
connected by an underground quantum link we demonstrate
the significant advantages of this method over the previous
state of the art, allowing for four orders of magnitude higher
gate-rates than in previous experiments. Additionally, the use
of quantum entanglement enables the detection of an eaves-
dropper, attempting to steal the program. We believe that can
be the basis for a wide field of further investigations including
new protocols and connections to known protocols like obliv-
ious transfer and quantum money [22–24]. Further advances
in source and detector technologies, would allow gate rates to
be increased even further. We believe that this demonstration
indicates the compatibility of our schemes with early quantum
internet implementations and highlights the viability of quan-
tum technologies using small quantum systems to enhance our
current classical capabilities.
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APPENDIX
A. Theory
1. Gk gate-OTPs
The presented protocol for G1 gates may be implemented
as a subroutine to realize all possible Gk gate-OTPs with in-
8formation theoretic security in a similar fashion to the pro-
tocol of [1], where subscripts 1 and k stand for gates with
1 and k inputs, respectively. All binary inputs to gates are
mapped to anti-commuting measurement set {Mi}, such that
each measurement is composed of separable qubit measure-
ments. Specifically
Mi =
2k−1⊗
j=1
σij ∀ i (2)
where σij ∈ {σX , σZ}. Thus all measurements are single
qubit operations in one of two bases. Each gate-OTP may be
written as
ρG =
1
Tr(I)
I + 1√
2k
2k∑
i=1
(−1)G(i)Mi
 (3)
=
∑
i
1
2k
ρi (4)
=
∑
i
1
2k
2k−1⊗
j=1
G˜ij
 (5)
where ρi is a pure state formed from a tensor product of single
qubit states G˜ij . Remarkably, each G˜ij is a G1 gate-OTP [1]
and via randomly selecting from the set of possible pure states,
the state received by the client is equivalent to the mixed state
ρG under all measurements. It is thus possible to implement a
Gk gate-OTP using only G1 states. The probability of correct-
ness Pk of such noisy logic gates is for all inputs
Pk =
1
2(1+k/2)
+
1
2
. (6)
The shared table records random implementations of G1
gates with measurements in both the σX and σZ basis. The
protocol presented in the main text allows secure evaluation
of the measurement of such states, and thus repeated applica-
tions may be used to construct measurement outcomes of Gk
gate-OTPs. The evaluation of all such gates-OTPs may be per-
formed concurrently as the corresponding measurements are
separable. We therefore expect the implementation of any Gk
gate-OTP to be completed within an average of log2
(
2k − 1)
rounds of classical communication. A dishonest client, who
has not made measurements and instead retained states in a
quantum memory, will be in possession of exactly the quan-
tum state intended and described by equation 3, the security
of which has been previously shown [1]. Thus, the delaying
of measurements does not allow Bob to obtain additional in-
formation regarding the one-time program.
B. Experimental Implementation
1. Source
A 515nm cw-laser (Roithner RLTMGL-515-500-2) with a
spectral bandwidth of 0.057nm and a power of 40mW is used
to pump a 30mm periodically-poled KTP (KTiOPO4) crys-
tal with a poling period of 33.53µm. This is phase-matched
for two SPDC processes, one emitting |H〉s |V 〉l as well as|V 〉s |H〉l with λs = 785nm and λl = 1498nm. The two
down-conversion processes have a different spectral width,
thus we use a narrow bandwidth filter (0.45nm) for the pho-
tons in the long-wavelength arm. It turns out that it is not nec-
essary to filter the photons in the short-wavelength arm as only
photons in the desired wavelength interval will cause coinci-
dences. We found a coincidence rate between Alice and Bob
of 10kHz using a coincidence time window of 6ns. Transmis-
sion losses between Alice’s and Bob’s laboratory were mea-
sured to be 13± 2%. Using the measured double clicks at one
side as well as the detector efficiency and transmission losses
we can estimate the percentage of times where more than one
photon was emitted finding a value of 0.097%. Assuming Bob
could use all of these events to improve his probability of suc-
cess when cheating (i.e. for this percentage of events he has
the honest probability of success even when signing two lines)
this raises his overall probability of success for a signature run
from 0.107% to 0.112%.
2. Bell State
Following [2] we calculated a lower bound on the fidelity
F = 〈Ψ−| ρexp |Ψ−〉 of the quantum state produced in Al-
ice’s lab. We find a value of F ≥ 0.966± 0.003. Furthermore
in Fig. 6 we show the coincidence counts (measured locally
in Alice’s laboratory) with respect to the relative angle of po-
larizes inserted into both arms of the source together with a
sinusoidal fit using non-linear least squares. Fig. 7 shows the
probability of success for all four one-bit gates and both pos-
sible inputs.
3. Bell inequality violation
Alice and Bob choose 5000 lines from their shared table
to violate a CHSH-Bell inequality [3] as a measure to detect
a potential eavesdropper performing a man-in-the-middle at-
tack. They find a Bell parameter of S = 2.701±0.042 violat-
ing the classical bound of S = 2 by 16.8 standard deviations.
4. Synchronisation
Alice and Bob use each an identical Time Tagging module
(Roithner TTM 8000) to record their detection events. After
a measurement run they exchange the timing information on
9FIG. 6. Coincidences in linear and diagonal basis: Coincidences in
dependence of the polarizer angle in Alice’s (he short-wavelength)
arm while a polarizer in the long-wavelength arm is fixed at |H〉
(solid line) or |+〉 (dashed line). The Visibility is calculated from the
sinusodial fit to be 0.974 ± 0.002 in the linear basis and 0.965 ±
0.002 in the diagonal basis. Blue dots represent experimental data,
error bars show one standard deviation and are derived assuming a
poissonian distribution.
their detected photons to find coincidences. As the clock fre-
quency of the two devices is not identical and the exact start-
ing time of the measurement might vary in the two laborato-
ries they need to find the offset between their respective time
stamps. This is achieved using the switch in the path of the
pump laser, before the crystal. Whenever a measurement is
started Alice and Bob start their data acquisition with a closed
switch. The same signal that triggers the start of the measure-
ment will also trigger the switch to open. Alice and Bob will
detect the sharp increase in single photon detections and use
this to find a first estimate for the offset in their data. Further-
FIG. 7. Probability of success by state and input. The black dashed
line shows the theoretical prediction. The probability of succeess
was calculated for all four gates and two inputs each using a sample
of 50000 lines of the shared table. Error bars show one standard
deviation.
more, the first 100 ms of each measurement run are used by
Alice and Bob to find the correct offset and calibrate their tim-
ing offsets. After this period the switch is closed and opened
again, indicating the start of the distribution of a shared table.
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